I. Introduction
The true value of a commercial claim lies in whether it can be enforced. A court judgment has less value for the judgment-creditor if it can be enforced only with difficulty and delays, and it has no value if it cannot be enforced at all. Against this background, the facilitation of cross-border enforcement of commercial claims and judgments significantly impacts companies conducting their business globally. Within the EU, certain improvements for judgment-creditors will come with the revised Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters ("2012 Brussels I Regulation"). 1 For judgments handed down in legal proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015, 2 the new regulation abolishes the requirement of exequatur. This is an intermediate court procedure that aims to declare a foreign judgment enforceable before the actual enforcement and in 93% of cases is a formality. 3 The abolition of exequatur had been on the EU's agenda since the European Council of Tampere in 1999 4 and has been implemented in a number of EU regulations issued since 2004. 5 As a result, exequatur proceedings are no longer required today for claims up to EUR 2,000, uncontested claims and claims for family maintenance. However, exequatur is still required under the current Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction change for the judgment-creditors and judgment-debtors under the revised Regulation (Section IV. below).
This paper does not deal with the free movement of authentic instruments or court settlements.
14 It also does not address in detail the recognition and enforcement of foreign provisional measures. 15 Regarding the latter, it is important to note that the European Parliament and Council did not follow the Commission's proposal to allow the enforcement of provisional measures that were ordered ex parte and not served on the debtor prior to enforcement.
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II. Mechanisms of Enforcing a Foreign Judgment under the 2001 and the 2012 Brussels I Regulation
The 2001 and 2012 Brussels I Regulations distinguish between recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The mechanisms of recognizing a judgment have remained unchanged under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation: For judgments that the creditor does not seek to enforce, no application for recognition is necessary, even though such an application is possible. 17 Foreign court judgments that dismiss a claim or grant declaratory relief, for example, are therefore recognized automatically.
For judgments that the creditor seeks to enforce, the 2001 Brussels I Regulation requires a declaration of enforceability (exequatur) before enforcement measures can proceed. 18 The court or authority grants exequatur ex parte, i.e., without prior notice to the debtor, and without reviewing the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement.
19 The judgment-debtor can then appeal against the exequatur and have the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement examined. 20 The judgment-creditor can proceed to enforcement measures only if and when the judgment-debtor does not appeal or the appeal is dismissed. 21 In the meantime, the judgment-creditor is limited to protective measures. Under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation, the judgment-creditor can directly apply for enforcement as if the judgment had been given in the enforcement state. However, no enforcement measures will be taken before the judgment-debtor is informed of the request for enforcement. 23 The judgment-debtor may apply to a court for the refusal of enforcement, 24 in which case the competent court has discretion to limit the enforcement pending a final decision on the application. In any case, the judgment-creditor is entitled to protective measures.
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III. Reasons for Exequatur and its Abolition under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation
A.
Main Purposes of Exequatur
Exequatur has three main purposes:
(1) to authorize the enforcement authorities to act,
to instruct the enforcement authorities how to act, and (3) to review the foreign judgment.
The first purpose of exequatur is to authorize the enforcement authorities to act ("title import"). This function is not particularly important in the present European framework 26 and does not justify keeping exequatur proceedings. Where the national enforcement law provides that a court must authorize all enforcement acts (such as in Germany), such requirement can be maintained provided that it applies equally to domestic and foreign judgments.
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The second purpose of exequatur is to clarify how the enforcement authorities should act. This purpose is relevant primarily in two situations. First, foreign judgment might contain insufficient information that needs to be supplemented ("title supplementation"). Some common examples are judgments ordering the defendant to pay money plus interest at the statutory rate that is unknown to the foreign enforcement authorities, 28 31 This extended Certificate gives the enforcement authorities sufficient support and information, whereas a declaration of enforceability does not add anything.
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The second situation occurs when the foreign judgment contains an order or a measure unknown to the enforcement state; this order or measure needs to be transformed into a title that can be enforced with the available enforcement measures ("title transformation"). Some examples are the concept of usufruct, 33 or interim measures in the form of world-wide freezing orders or search orders that do not exist in all Member States.
With regard to this second situation, the 2012 Brussels I Regulation introduced an explicit obligation for the competent authority of the enforcement state to adapt, "to the extent possible, […] the measure or order to one known under its own law which has equivalent effects attached to it and pursues similar aims and interests."
34 Enforcement authorities may have difficulty adapting the foreign judgment, 35 which could indicate the benefit of maintaining exequatur. However, for cases of difficulties and disagreements, the 2012 Brussels I Regulation provides that any party may challenge the adaptation before a court. 36 This provides sufficient protection to both parties. Even if the enforcement authorities may have difficulty adapting foreign measures in certain cases, this does not command exequatur for all cases. In any case, even without exequatur, title transformation is not problematic in countries such as Germany, where courts must authorize all enforcement acts for all judgments (domestic and foreign). In this framework, courts can at the same time adapt the judgment where necessary. 29 The third purpose of exequatur is to review, at least to a certain extent, the foreign judgment ("title inspection"). This review serves the protection of the debtor. However, exequatur itself is not needed for the foreign judgment to be reviewed. In fact, the court of first instance declaring exequatur does not examine the grounds for review under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation either; such grounds are examined only upon the debtor's appeal against the exequatur decision. In other words, the existing exequatur proceedings fulfill the purpose of title inspection only upon appeal. Therefore, one can keep the remedy and do away with the first instance procedure 37 without any loss, and this is what the 2012 Brussels I Regulation has done.
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In summary, none of the purposes of exequatur justify maintaining the procedure. These purposes are achieved through other means.
B. Reasons for Abolishing Exequatur
The themes in the abolition of exequatur are mutual trust and free movement of judgments within the EU. 39 All Member States and a large majority of stakeholders supported the objective of free movement of judgments during the consultation process, and there was also general support for abolishing exequatur as a means to achieve this objective, provided that certain safeguards for the judgment-debtor existed. 40 While support exists on the principle of free movement of judgments, divergent views exist on its importance. Some are of the opinion that "it would […] be a contradiction in itself if in an internal market and in a single area of law judgments could not circulate as freely as within one single state." 41 However, the situation in the USA and Canada (both of which are integrated markets with distinct jurisdictions) leads others to conclude that the idea of exequatur and of some form of review of non-domestic judgments is not alien to such markets. 42 Leaving such questions of principle aside, the best reasons for abolishing exequatur were practical and based on a cost-benefit analysis. 43 The 44 of all applications (and associated delays and costs) for which the first-instance exequatur decision is not being appealed, 45 while at the same time maintaining the necessary protection of the judgment-debtor. 46 According to a survey of the Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services (CSES), two-thirds of businesses and consumer organizations said that they would be "a lot more inclined" (39.4%) or "slightly more inclined" (26.7%) to engage in (more) cross-border commercial activity if, in the event of a dispute, a judgment obtained in one Member State was enforceable in another Member State without additional procedures. 47 Thus, abolishing exequatur can strengthen crossborder trade and promote more extensive use of the internal market.
The most fundamental requirement for abolishing exequatur is the existence of mutual trust between the Member States. When making its proposals for revision, the Commission took the view that "the level of trust among Member States has reached a degree of maturity," which in general would permit abolishing exequatur.
48 By contrast, the Commission did not assume the required level of trust in collective redress and defamation cases. This was due to the lack of harmonized rules, large differences in the resolution of these questions and the underlying conflict between the various fundamental rights at stake. 49 Therefore, the Commission suggested maintaining exequatur in these two areas. 50 In the end, however, the European Parliament and Council did not adopt this exception to the general abolition of exequatur, for reasons that include legal certainty. Two studies have collected empirical data on exequatur under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. Based on these studies, two reports were published estimating the actual duration, cost and success rate of exequatur 52 and were considered for the Commission's 2010 Impact Assessment. 53 The estimations must be treated carefully, however. Nineteen of the twenty seven Member States, including Germany and the United Kingdom, do not collect data on the number of exequatur applications at the national level. 54 In seven Member States, not even the courts keep a record of the number of exequatur cases. 55 The length of first instance of exequatur proceedings under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation differs significantly among the Member States. Factors influencing the duration include the level of sophistication of the courts concerned and their existing workload. Sometimes these factors also differ considerably within a Member State. According to the statistics, first instance exequatur proceedings can last between one to two hours (Hungary) or three to six months (Estonia), provided the submitted documentation is complete. 56 Between one-third and two-thirds of the Member States render the exequatur decision within less than 30 days following the submission of the application.
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Ninety to one hundred percent of the applications are successful in the first instance. 58 Only one to five percent of the exequatur decisions are appealed. 59 The appeal proceedings can last between one to two months (United Kingdom) or as long as three years (Malta: first hearing after two years, decision three to twelve months later).
60 Between one-third and two-thirds of the Member States render the appeal decision in less than six months.
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CSES estimates that in 2009 just over 9,900 exequatur applications were made across the Member States and that an average of 93% were successful. In all Member States except Bulgaria (56%), more than three-quarters of the applications were successful, and in two-thirds of the Member States the success rate was 85% or higher. 62 (1,156 with an average success rate of 93%).
63 CSES concludes that the number of exequatur cases remains modest but that it is generally increasing.
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CSES estimates that the average costs of exequatur proceedings in a simple case in 2009 were EUR 2,208. This consists of court fees (EUR 53), legal fees (5h = EUR 1,205), and other fees (e.g. cost of serving documents, translations = EUR 850). 65 For complex cases, the average costs are EUR 12,791. 66 Based on the average costs, the number of cases and the overall success rate, CSES estimates the total costs of exequatur proceedings in the EU in 2009 to be approximately EUR 48 million.
67 CSES concludes that the estimated direct cost-saving for small and medium-sized enterprises amounts to EUR 6.16 million if exequatur is abolished (not including indirect savings such as management time). 
A.
The Judgment-Creditor's Exequatur or Enforcement Application
Content of the Application
Under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, the judgment-creditor must request exequatur before proceeding to the actual enforcement. The application must set out the requirements that the competent court or authority examines ex officio. 70 In practice, it is recommended that the enforcement-creditor requests that protective measures be taken, either immediately or when granting exequatur.
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Under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation, the judgment-creditor can directly request enforcement measures without any declaration of enforceability. The application must set out the requirements that the competent court or authority examines ex officio. 72 In practice, the judgment-creditor should request that protective measures be taken immediately and ex parte, before the Certificate and the judgment (if not previously served) are served on the judgment-debtor. 
Documents and Translations to Be Submitted with the Application
The extent to which a judgment-creditor must collect and translate documents in order to apply for exequatur or cross-border enforcement considerably impacts the duration and costs of preparing the application. The 2012 Brussels I Regulation introduces some changes that aim to protect the judgment-debtor. Under the 2001 and 2012 Brussels I Regulations, the judgment-creditor must submit two documents to the court in support of his exequatur or enforcement application:
(1) a copy of the judgment satisfying the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity; and (2) a certificate issued by the court of origin using the standard form annexed to the Brussels I Regulation (the "Brussels I Certificate"). Regulation. To the contrary, the 2012 Brussels I Certificate must be served on the judgment-debtor prior to the first enforcement measure.
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The 2012 Brussels I Regulation increases the protection for the judgmentdebtor regarding translations. Under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, the judgmentcreditor must submit a translation of both the judgment and the Certificate only if required by the court or authority of the enforcement state. 78 While no translation is required as a rule, the Heidelberg Report criticizes the fact that most Member State courts regularly request a translation of the judgment. 79 The 2001 Brussels I Regulation contains no right of the judgment-debtor to request a translation of the judgment.
Under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation, the enforcement authority may request a transliteration or translation of the Certificate, but it may require a translation of the judgment only if it is unable to proceed without such a translation. 80 However, the 2012 Brussels I Regulation entitles a judgment-debtor domiciled in a Member State other than the state of origin to request a translation of the judgment if it is written in a language that he does not understand and that is not an official language at the place of his domicile. 81 Until the judgment-debtor receives the requested translation, only protective measures may be taken, not enforcement measures. 82 This amendment constitutes an important protection of the judgmentdebtor at the expense of the judgment-creditor.
Requirement of a Service Address in the Member State of Enforcement
The 2001 Brussels I Regulation requires the judgment-creditor either to provide a service address within the area of jurisdiction of the exequatur court or to appoint a representative ad litem. 83 This de facto requirement of a local lawyer for exequatur proceedings has met with objections, 84 as most national laws do not require legal representation in this type of proceedings. 85 The foreign judgment and assign the competence for exequatur to a master or registrar.
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If the requirements listed above are fulfilled, the competent court or authority will do the following: -Under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, the competent court declares the foreign judgment enforceable. 94 The grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement are examined only if and when the judgment-debtor files an appeal against the exequatur.
95 If so requested, the competent court will proceed to protective measures, 96 and finally to enforcement measures once an appeal against exequatur is no longer possible or has been dismissed.
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Under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation, the competent court or authority will, as the case may be, proceed to protective measures (if requested) and/or serve the Certificate and the judgment (if not previously served) on the judgment-debtor prior to the first enforcement measure. 98 The grounds for refusing enforcement are examined only if and when the judgment-debtor files an application for refusing enforcement. 
Content and Adaptation of the Foreign Judgment
The content of the foreign judgment determines what protective and/or enforcement measures the seized court or authority will take. The 2012 Brussels I Certificate provides detailed information about the content of the judgment, unlike the 2001 Brussels I Certificate. 100 The 2012 Brussels I Regulation thereby makes it easier for the enforcement court or authority to take the appropriate protective and/or enforcement measures, while putting an additional burden on the court of origin.
In case of monetary claims, the 2012 Brussels I Certificate sets out the following information: The principal amount to be paid, and whether it must be paid in one sum, in installments (together with information about the amount and due date of each installment) or regularly (together with information about the frequency of payments);
(e) The contractual and/or statutory interest to be paid, including the amount, interest rate or statutory basis, the start and end date/event, and whether and how interest is to be capitalized.
For judgments other than monetary judgments, the 2012 Brussels I Certificate sets out a short description of the subject-matter of the case and of the court's ruling.
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In case of provisional measures, the 2012 Brussels I Certificate also sets out whether the measure was ordered by a court having jurisdiction for the substance of the matter.
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For judgments or orders other than monetary judgments, it may become necessary to adapt the foreign decision if the order or measure is not known to the law of the enforcement state. 105 The competence and procedure for adapting the foreign decision is subject to national law. determine when the enforcement application is served on the judgment-debtor. 109 In any case, protective measures are available as soon as the judgment is enforceable in the state of origin, and without the need for serving the 2012 Brussels I Certificate and the foreign judgment prior to obtaining such measures (see the following Section D.).
D. Time of Obtaining Protective Measures
Provisional (protective) measures serve to balance the interests of the judgmentcreditor and those of the judgment-debtor. The judgment-creditor has an interest in securing the effective enforcement of the judgment by, for example, freezing assets necessary for the enforcement. The judgment-debtor, on the other hand, has an interest in not being definitely deprived of his assets in case he has grounds to refuse enforcement of the judgment. The time when protective measures are effectively available is important. Under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, the competent authorities must grant a request for protective measures when exequatur is granted in first instance. 110 Prior to this time, and even without any exequatur proceedings, the judgment-creditor is entitled to apply for protective measures under the national law of the Member States.
111 However, the Heidelberg Report observes that this provision of the 2001 Brussels I Regulation is not often applied, and that its interpretation and implementation in the national laws of the Member States is an area of unsettled law.
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Under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation, the situation is more defined. As soon as the judgment is enforceable in the state of origin, the competent authorities in the other Member States must proceed, if and when requested, to any protective measures that exist under their national law. 113 This excludes any national requirements such as urgency or plausibility that the enforcement is in danger. The 2012 Brussels I Regulation thus effectively reinforces the position of the judgmentcreditor. The protective measure will be ordered without serving the 2012 Brussels I Certificate on the judgment-debtor. 114 This means that the protective measure must be ordered ex parte (i.e., without any prior notification to the judgmentdebtor) even if national law were to generally provide for notice of the application to the debtor. The surprise effect under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, which explicitly provides for notice to the judgment-debtor only when exequatur is granted, 115 should be maintained also under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation. It is not required that the judgment-creditor submit an application for enforcement prior to or together with her application for protective measures.
E. Time of Obtaining Enforcement Measures
Under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, the judgment-creditor can obtain effective enforcement only after the period for appealing the exequatur decision has lapsed or, in case of an appeal, after the appeal has been dismissed. 116 The judgmentcreditor can thus obtain enforcement at the earliest one month after service of the exequatur decision if the debtor is domiciled in the enforcement state, and two months after service of the exequatur decision if the debtor is domiciled elsewhere. 117 The 2001 Brussels I Regulation thus grants the judgment-debtor an automatic "grace period."
Under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation, there is no such automatic "grace period." The judgment-debtor must -and can -take active steps to delay enforcement. Prior to the first enforcement measure, the 2012 Brussels I Certificate and the judgment (if not previously served) must be served on the judgment-debtor.
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A judgment-debtor domiciled in a Member State other than the state of origin may then request a translation of the judgment if it is not written in or accompanied by a translation into a language that she understands or that is an official language of the place where she is domiciled.
119 If the judgment-debtor requests such a translation, no enforcement measures may be taken other than protective measures until she has received the translation.
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Enforcement measures are not automatically excluded if the judgmentdebtor applies for refusal of enforcement. 121 However, upon request of the judgment-debtor, the competent court has discretion to limit enforcement to protective measures, make enforcement conditional on the provision of a security, or suspend enforcement either wholly or in part. 122 When exercising its discretion, the competent court will consider the seriousness of the judgment-debtor's objections to the enforcement. The enforcement court or authority has no such discretion if the enforceability of the judgment is suspended in the Member State of origin: In that case, the enforcement court or authority must suspend the enforcement proceedings upon request of the judgment-debtor. 
F. Review of the Foreign Judgment upon Application by the JudgmentDebtor
One of the main purposes of exequatur was originally the inspection of the foreign judgment, i.e., the examination of certain grounds for review. This review is part of weighing the respective interests of the judgment-creditor and the judgmentdebtor. While a speedy, inexpensive and effective Europe-wide enforcement of the judgment serves the judgment-creditor's interest, the judgment-debtor has a legitimate interest in maintaining safeguards against violation of his fundamental rights.
Compared to the 1968 Brussels Convention, the 2001 Brussels I Regulation shifted the balance towards the judgment-creditor's interest by postponing the examination of the grounds for review until the appeal proceedings against the exequatur decision. The abolition of exequatur under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation maintains this balance, and it does not shift it any further towards the judgment-creditor's interest. Only few changes were made to the grounds for reviewing the foreign judgment (Section 1 below) and to the review procedure (Section 2 below) compared to the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. This is despite the fact that the 2010 Brussels I Proposal of the Commission contained significant changes. 
Grounds for Review
The 2001 Brussels I Regulation provides for the following grounds for review: violation of procedural and substantive public policy, insufficient service of the documents initiating the proceedings in case of default judgments, incompatibility with other judgments and violation of certain provisions on jurisdiction.
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According to the Commission, judgment-debtors most often invoke the lack of due service in case of default judgments, although they rarely succeed.
126 Procedural public policy is also frequently invoked, but rarely accepted, and a defense based on substantive public policy is extremely rare. 127 The other grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement are rarely invoked (and equally rarely accepted).
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The grounds for review were much debated during the revision of the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. The views of the stakeholders differed on whether and to what extent the grounds for review should be maintained. 129 Most stakeholders proposed neither an increase nor a reduction of the number of grounds for review. 130 In addition to the grounds for review under the Brussels I Regulation, the judgment-debtor can invoke grounds for refusing enforcement available under national law, to the extent that they are not incompatible with the grounds for review under the Brussels I Regulation. 132 One typical example is the objection that the claim has been satisfied after the judgment was rendered. 133 The judgmentdebtor can -and according to certain legal commentators, must 134 -invoke such additional national grounds for refusing enforcement with the grounds referred to in Article 45 of the 2012 Brussels I Regulation. 135 
a) Violation of Procedural Public Policy
The 2001 Brussels I Regulation provides that a foreign judgment shall not be recognized if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the enforcement state. 136 This ground for review has remained unchanged under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation. It is commonplace that the notion of public policy encompasses procedural public policy as well as substantive public policy. Procedural public policy includes in particular the defendant's right to be heard. In practice, procedural public policy is frequently invoked in cases of corruption, procedural fraud or other severe breaches of procedural fairness in the course of the proceedings. While the 2010 Brussels I Proposal of the Commission suggested introducing a uniform European standard for procedural public policy, 138 these changes were not adopted in the 2012 Brussels I Regulation. Thus, the courts of the enforcement state will still be entitled to apply their own national concept of public policy. However, they can do so only within specified European limits, 139 which are inspired by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"). 140 This means that the courts are entitled to refuse enforcement only if the violated principle of national public policy has sufficient weight under European standards, in particular under the standards of the ECHR. The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has accepted the refusal of enforcement in cases where the court of origin refused to hear the defendant's representative when the defendant did not appear personally, 141 and where the court of origin excluded the defendant from further participating in the proceedings and thereby manifestly and disproportionately infringed his right to be heard. Bamberski, C-7/98, paras 24-27. Article 6(1) ECHR reads: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. Danieli, C-394/07: An English court held the defendant Gambazzi to be in contempt of court for violating a disclosure order issued earlier in the proceedings and excluded him from further participating in the proceedings. Gambazzi objected to the recognition of the English judgment in Italy, and the ECJ found that the Italian court was entitled to refuse recognition and enforcement of the English decision "if, following a comprehensive assessment of the proceedings and in the light of all the circumstances, it appears to it that that exclusion measure constituted a manifest and disproportionate infringement of the defendant's right to be heard." In this context, it is interesting that Gambazzi had applied to the ECtHR in the early 2000s and that his granted by Article 6(1) ECHR does not belong to the national procedural public policy of the enforcement state, the enforcement state is not obliged to refuse recognition and enforcement on this ground. 143 Thus, the ECJ examines under the 2001 and the 2012 Brussels I Regulation only whether a national court may refuse enforcement on a particular procedural ground, not whether the national court must refuse enforcement.
b) Violation of Substantive Public Policy
Under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, recognition of a foreign judgment can be refused if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the substantive public policy of the enforcement state. 144 This ground for review has remained unchanged in the 2012 Brussels I Regulation, despite the fact that the 2010 Brussels I Proposal of the Commission suggested abolishing the review of substantive public policy, as other EU regulations issued since 2004 did.
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Judgment-debtors have only very rarely invoked substantive public policy successfully. 146 For example, the German Federal Supreme Court ("BGH") applied substantive public policy in its famous Sonntag-decision, 147 which has often been criticized. The Heidelberg Report sees two main factors leading to the rare application of substantive public policy:
148 First, there are no fundamental differences between the legal systems of the Member States in civil and commercial matters that could trigger the application of substantive public policy. And second, the 147 BGH, 16 September 1993, BGHZ 123, 268: Sonntag was a school teacher at a German school. During a school trip to Italy, a schoolboy died in an accident. An Italian criminal court ordered the teacher to pay damages to the boy's parents. The BGH refused enforcement of the decision. This was because, under German law, the social security system replaces the personal liability of a teacher at a public school for injuries suffered by the students, and therefore only the state employing the teacher can be sued for compensation.
148 B. HESS, in Heidelberg Report (note 29), at 144 para. 491.
substance of the foreign judgment may not be reviewed. 149 It is therefore difficult to argue that the content of a judgment violates substantive public policy. In fact, according to the ECJ decision in Renault v. Maxicar, the court of enforcement may not refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment even if it considers that Community law was misapplied. 150 However, the European Parliament and Council finally sided with those concerned about giving up a tool that could still be needed in some rare and extreme situations and that could act as an "emergency brake for cases in which something went terribly wrong." 151 
c) Lack of Due Service in Case of Default Judgments
In case of default judgments, parties most often resist enforcement based on defects in the service of the document instituting the proceedings. 152 This ground for review was subject to change during the transition from the 1968 Brussels Convention to the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. Under the 1968 Brussels Convention, the debtor of a default judgment could refuse enforcement if the document instituting the proceedings "was not duly served […] in sufficient time to enable [the defendant] to arrange for his defence." 153 The 2001 Brussels I Regulation abandoned the notion of "duly served" and provided the judgmentdebtor with a ground for refusing enforcement if service was not made "in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence." 154 This language has remained unchanged in the 2012 Brussels I Regulation. 155 The wording makes clear that compliance with the applicable provisions on proper service is not examined. The only issue examined is whether the service effectively enabled the defendant to take note of the action and prepare his defense. 156 The date of service is indicated on the 2001 and the 2012 Brussels I Certificate.
The 2012 Brussels I Regulation also maintains the limitation introduced by the 2001 Brussels I Regulation (but not applied in Switzerland) 158 that the judgment-debtor cannot invoke the ground for refusal if "he failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so." 159 This exception requires that the judgment-debtor be acquainted with the contents of the judgment because it was served on him in sufficient time to enable him to prepare his defense. 160 The 2010 Brussels I Proposal of the Commission suggested adding a new ground for refusing enforcement of a default judgment if the defaulting defendant "was prevented from contesting the claim by reason of force majeure or due to extraordinary circumstances without any fault on his part," 161 in line with other EU regulations issued since 2004. 162 However, the European Parliament and Council did not adopt this suggestion and left the ground for review unchanged.
d) Incompatibility with Other Judgments
Under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, recognition of a foreign judgment can be refused if the foreign judgment is irreconcilable with either (a) a judgment rendered in the enforcement state in a dispute between the same parties or (b) an earlier recognizable judgment rendered in another state in a dispute between the same parties and involving the same cause of action. 163 This ground for review has remained unchanged, 164 despite criticism in legal commentaries and the fact that consistent changes were made in most other EU regulations issued since 2004 that abolished exequatur. 165 The criticism relates mainly to two issues. The first issue is the priority of a domestic judgment over the foreign judgment even if the foreign judgment was rendered earlier. 166 This priority was abolished in the aforementioned EU regula-tions. 167 The second criticism relates to the priority of an earlier judgment regardless of whether it was obtained in violation of the lis pendens rule of the Regulation. 168 At least three different solutions were proposed to fix this problem, which could lead to different results. 169 However, the European Parliament and Council decided not to make any changes.
e) Limited Jurisdictional Review
Under the 2001 and 2012 Brussels I Regulations, the court of the enforcement state may not, in principle, review the jurisdiction of the court of origin. 170 The sole exception relates to the review of some clearly defined provisions on jurisdiction. 171 However, judgment-debtors have rarely invoked this ground for review.
172 Its practical relevance is limited because the findings of fact of the court of origin are binding on the reviewing court. 173 The 2012 Brussels I Regulation includes two changes to the limited jurisdictional review. First, the jurisdictional review applies not only to the rules on exclusive jurisdiction and to the jurisdictional provisions for insurance and consumer contracts, 174 but now also to the jurisdictional provisions for individual employment contracts. 175 Second, the 2012 Brussels I Regulation better implements the purpose of protecting the typically weaker party in insurance, consumer and employment contract matters. While the wording of the 2001 Brussels I Regulation allows also the typically stronger party to resist recognition and enforcement, 176 the 2012 Brussels I Regulation clarifies that the jurisdictional review only applies if the defendant was one of the following persons: the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance contract, the injured party, the consumer or the employee. 177 In its 2010 Brussels I Proposal, the Commission proposed to abolish the limited jurisdictional review. Indeed, this review appears inconsistent with the general principle of mutual trust and the fact that all Member States are bound by uniform rules. 178 The ECJ stated repeatedly that it "is inherent in that principle of mutual trust that, within the scope of the Convention, the rules on jurisdiction that it lays down, which are common to all the courts of the Contracting States, may be interpreted and applied with the same authority by each of them." 179 However, the European Parliament and Council decided to maintain -and even extend -the limited jurisdictional review, in line with those who stressed the importance and to some extent the public character of the jurisdictional rules at stake. 
Review Procedure
Under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, the grounds for review are examined upon the judgment-debtor's appeal against the exequatur decision. 181 The 2001 Brussels I Regulation provides for two levels of appeal and thus for two instances that examine the grounds for review. 182 Even though the 2001 Brussels I Regulation stipulates that the appellate court "shall give its decision without delay,"
183 the duration of the appeal proceedings varies significantly between the Member States. 184 Under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation, the courts examine the grounds for review upon the judgment-debtor's application for refusal of enforcement. 185 As under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, the court shall decide "without delay." 186 Up to two levels of appeal are available against the first-instance decision on the application, 187 which may lead in some Member States to three instances that examine the grounds for review. 188 This change to the 2001 Brussels I Regulation creates the risk of longer delays to the actual enforcement, which the courts can somewhat moderate by allowing enforcement partially or against the provision of security. 189 The 2012 Brussels I Regulation provides that only the "person against whom enforcement is sought" has standing to apply for refusal of enforcement. 190 At first sight, this seems to prevent a judgment-debtor from filing such an application as a precautionary measure before the judgment-creditor seeks enforcement. However, the 2012 Brussels I Regulation provides a broader possibility for "any interested party" to apply for refusal of recognition of a judgment. 191 A judgmentdebtor who is domiciled or has assets within the jurisdiction of the addressed court has a legitimate interest in applying for refusal of recognition of the foreign judgment. This is because a successful application would prevent any protective measures against the judgment-debtor such as the freezing of assets. Judgmentdebtors are thus free to apply for refusal of recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment even before the judgment-creditor seeks enforcement. 192 Upon an application for refusal of recognition, the same grounds for review are examined 193 and the same procedures apply 194 as upon an application for refusal of enforcement. Regarding the review procedure, the 2012 Brussels I Regulation deviates significantly from the Commission's 2010 Brussels I Proposal. Under the 2010 Brussels I Proposal, three different authorities were proposed competent to examine the different grounds for review: the competent (enforcement) authority was proposed competent to examine the incompatibility with other judgments; the competent court of the state of origin was proposed competent to examine the specific grounds for review against default judgments; and the competent court of the enforcement state was proposed competent to examine the compliance with the debtor's right to a fair trial. 195 The competence of different authorities for different grounds for review would have presented challenges in explaining to the debtors their rights of appeal. However, this was not a unique feature of the 2010 Brussels I Proposal. Other EU regulations issued since 2004 that have abolished exequatur provide for similar solutions, as shown in the following section.
Within the framework outlined above, the review procedure is subject to the law of the enforcement state.
196 National law will therefore determine what court is competent, what time limit the judgment-debtor must respect for filing the application and what procedure applies. In the first scenario the judgment-debtor does not take any steps to have the foreign judgment reviewed, whereas in the second scenario his does take such steps. Importantly, while the timelines show the sequence of events, they are not true to scale. The duration of a time period depends in many cases on the practice of the court concerned and on other circumstances. For example, the Certificate under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation might potentially be served on the judgmentdebtor before or after the court concerned would have rendered its exequatur decision under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. This depends on the speed and efficiency of the court concerned and on where the judgment-debtor is being served, also considering that the judgment-debtor might have his domicile outside the EU.
Timeline for Enforcement without Review of the Foreign Judgment
If the judgment-debtor does not take any steps to have the foreign judgment reviewed, the judgment-creditor can potentially obtain enforcement measures in certain cases more quickly under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation than under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. This is because the judgment-creditor does not need to obtain exequatur, and there is no automatic "grace period" before enforcement can commence. 201 However, this possible time advantage will depend on how quickly the Certificate is served on the judgment-debtor under the 2012 Brussels I 201 See Section IV.E. above.
Regulation and how soon the enforcement authorities take enforcement measures after such service. In that regard, Recital 32 of the 2012 Brussels I Regulation speaks of a reasonable time period between service of the Certificate and the first enforcement measure. It will be for the courts (including the ECJ) to determine whether this reasonable time period will be shorter than the time period for appeal under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. If it is equally long, the only time advantage under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation will lie in abolishing the exequatur proceedings. In any case, the 2012 Brussels I Regulation provides the judgment-creditor with a clearer legal basis for obtaining protective measures at an early stage.
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Timeline for Enforcement with Review of the Foreign Judgment
If the judgment-debtor takes the available steps to have the foreign judgment reviewed, I expect that the timing of enforcement measures will in many cases not be fundamentally different under the 2001 and the 2012 Brussels I Regulations. This will at least be the case in Member States that provide for only one level of appeal under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation. In those Member States that provide for two levels of appeal, enforcement measures might actually occur later under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation than under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. However, in other cases an earlier enforcement is possible under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation than under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. This might be the case, for example, if the judgment-debtor does not apply expeditiously for refusal of enforcement or if the competent court makes use of its discretion to allow limited enforcement or enforcement against provision of a security. 203 In any case, as already noted, the judg-ment-creditor has a clearer legal basis under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation to obtain protective measures at an early stage.
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V. Conclusion
The 2012 Brussels I Regulation brings certain improvements for the judgmentcreditor, but it also includes some improvements for the judgment-debtor. Overall, the amendments do not constitute a quantum leap regarding the balance between the interests of the judgment-creditor and those of the judgment-debtor. The abolition of exequatur under the 2012 Brussels I Regulation is an important improvement for the judgment-creditor that will help saving costs. The judgment-debtor remains protected by the required service of the (more detailed) Brussels I Certificate and the foreign judgment in reasonable time before the first enforcement measure. Another important improvement for the judgment-creditor is the abolition of the automatic "grace period" prior to enforcement that existed under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation. However, the judgment-debtor can still delay enforcement, in particular by requesting a translation of the judgment (if the requirements for this request are fulfilled) and by applying for refusal of enforcement. In the latter case, however, the courts have more discretion than under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation to allow the enforcement to proceed, subject to a limitation of enforcement or to the provision of security.
In practice, an important improvement for the judgment-creditor is the clear basis for obtaining ex parte interim measures once the foreign judgment is enforceable in the Member State of origin. By contrast, under the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, the creditor's right to protective measures is generally accepted only following the exequatur decision. This delay in obtaining protective measures is partially compensated by the fact that the judgment-debtor is notified of the enforcement request only once exequatur is granted, but the 2001 Brussels I Regulation still gives him more time to dissipates assets.
Improvements for the judgment-debtor include his entitlement to a translation of the judgment if he is domiciled in a Member State other than the state of origin, and if the judgment is written in a language that he does not understand and that is not an official language at the place of his domicile. Other improvements are the fact that Member States can provide for a total of three court instances to examine the grounds for review -which can lead to longer delays to the actual enforcement -and the availability of a limited jurisdictional review also in case of individual employment contracts.
Finally, the 2012 Brussels I Regulation contains improvements for the courts and authorities in the enforcement states, whose work will be significantly facilitated by the more detailed Certificate. However, the court of origin must carry the burden of this improvement.
While the 2012 Brussels I Regulation will enter into force on 10 January 2015, its provisions on enforcement will only apply to decisions that were rendered in legal proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015. It will therefore still take some time until the new provisions must pass the field test.
